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1. Summary 
In the recent Handbook on Green Growth1, Fouquet (2019) highlights that the pursuit of “green 
growth” offers the opportunity for economies to expand and develop while still protecting their 
environment. However, “despite more than a decade of experience [of pursuing green growth], 
the potential of integrated economic and environmental policies to improve competitiveness and 
generate transformative economic growth and development is still poorly understood” (p.2). This 
highlights an important issue about the lack of strong evidence around how countries can move 
to low-carbon development pathways whilst still achieving economic growth. This is a complex 
field, with many ambiguities around definitions (e.g. the developmental state, the green 
economy), theories and approaches. There is also a large literature by scholars who see green 
growth as a contradiction in terms. Hence, given its limitations, this rapid review can only skim 
the surface of the “green developmental state” and what this might mean.  
This rapid review looks at some examples of countries that are beginning to pursue green growth 
(or at least in some sectors), highlighting the characteristics and challenges of these movements. 
The review focuses on how this transformation has been driven,2 focusing on state, private 
sector and civil society (in some cases). The case studies are not exhaustive and only give a 
snapshot of the (part) transformations to low-carbon development, this is important to keep in 
mind given the complexities of these pathways, the importance of context and that these 
transformations are inherently political as well as economical (and so often subject to the whims 
of political powers). Furthermore, these cases are not intended to suggest best practices but 
rather provide insights into how countries are creating commitment devices within their 
institutional and political contexts. The review firstly explores some of the literature around green 
growth, transitions theory and the role of institutions, coalitions and actors in energy 
transformations, with a focus on political economy analysis. The review also touches on 
developmental state theory and how lessons from this have been connected to green growth. 
The majority of the literature referred to in this review is academic. The review is largely gender 
blind, although the transition to low carbon development will need to be gender sensitive and this 
is acknowledged in the literature.  
Key points include: 
 There has generally been a lack of analysis of the state and significance of this in relation 
to sustainability transitions. However, the state is becoming an increasingly important 
point of reference in the literature, with a more nuanced understanding of the complex 
position of the state in the political economy of transitions. This is an emerging area of 
scholarship looking to foster understandings of politics and power, accelerating 
transitions, as well as why transitions proceed along very different trajectories in different 
transition contexts. Further work is needed (Johnstone & Newell, 2017).  
 Important considerations in transitions include: vested interests; the role of coalitions in 
supporting and hindering acceleration; the role of feedbacks, through which policies may 
shape actor preferences which, in turn, create stronger policies; the role of broader 
                                                   
1 There are many different understandings of the green growth concept, the OECD (2011: p.9) proposes that 
green growth means “fostering economic growth and development while ensuring that natural assets continue to 
provide the resources and environmental services on which our well-being relies.” OECD. (2011). Towards Green 
Growth. Paris: OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264111318-en.  
2 The terms transformation and transition are used interchangeably in this review. 
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contexts (political economies, institutions, cultural norms, technical systems) in creating 
more (or less) favourable conditions for deliberate acceleration (Roberts et al., 2017).  
Transformations to a low-carbon economy require multiple groups of actors across 
government, business and civil society and that each sector will have proponents and 
opponents to the change (Schmitz, 2017). 
 Williams (2014) argues that some kind of developmental state is essential to achieve 
sustainable development, but that there is no blueprint of effective state structures and 
action. Lessons can be learned from previous developmental state experiences, which 
encourage country-specific development that takes seriously local conditions, social 
demands from a myriad of class forces and domestic politics.   
 No country provides a role model for achieving low carbon development sustainably. 
Many developing countries and emerging economies are establishing green economy 
practices, but few have implemented economy-wide climate change laws or policies. 
Hence, there are limited opportunities to assess successes and failures. Some countries 
have made early steps, such as Morocco, the Gambia, Bhutan, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, 
India, Kenya and the Philippines (according to the Climate Action Tracker – 
https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/). Others have started to transform their energy 
systems, but their emissions remain high and climate commitments do not equate to 
limiting global warming to 2oC – such as Brazil, China and South Africa. These 
commitments to low carbon development and green growth are inherently political and 
often dependent on political will, which can ebb and flow. For example, Brazil was seen 
as progressive in its climate commitments, but this agenda lost momentum under the 
presidency of Dilma Rousseff and has slipped further with the accession of Bolsonaro. 
 There is no simple answer to who drives climate-relevant policies in China; it varies over 
time and along the central–local axis. The bundling of interests, however, has been 
important in all instances, supporting the coalition perspective (Schmitz, 2017). 
 In India a co-benefits approach has enabled stakeholders to engage in the climate 
change debate without conceding on their priority of accelerating economic development. 
However, no coherent strategy exists. The pursuit of energy security has been the most 
powerful driver of domestic action. Energy shortages have influenced the lack of 
opposition to solar and wind from fossil fuel industries (Schmitz, 2017). 
 In South Africa, moves towards renewables continue to be contested and there remains 
a struggle between coalitions for and against, splitting the public and the private sectors 
while civil society remains undecided. The renewables agenda is linked to an agenda of 
breaking up a vertically integrated, state-owned energy company (Schmitz, 2017). 
2. Transitions, low-carbon growth and developmental state 
theory 
What drives green transformations? 
Learning from the past and political economy analysis 
Fouquet (2019) highlights that up until now, few economies can claim to be low carbon (with a 
few exceptions such as Iceland and Costa Rica where large clean natural energy resource exist, 
and Germany and Denmark where strong political will exists). Nevertheless, some large emitting 
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developing countries have taken steps towards low carbon development and transforming their 
economies. A key feature of successful economies, as argued by Fouquet (2019: p.2), “has been 
their ability to transform – to continue to grow and develop economically by investing returns in 
valuable and productive activities.” Hence, Fouquet (2019) argues that structural transformation 
is necessary for economic and social advancement, and green growth offers a new potential 
source of this. Fouquet (2019) highlights some key characteristics related to previous economic 
transformations: 
 Vested interests: Powerful vested interests have been central in limiting the potential for 
economies and societies to transform. This is linked to a lack of incentives for 
incumbents, those that had gained power when their economy grew, to instigate 
structural change, and the complicity/dependency of politicians on these incumbents. 
 Importance of natural capital and diversification: The failure to govern existing natural 
capital properly in a country can hinder the momentum of economic growth. This 
highlights the critical role natural capital (in particular, land) played in traditional economic 
activity. Resource-based development is often successful initially yet limited in the long 
run. Although, economies can struggle to invest returns in more dynamic and productive 
sectors – partly due to the aforementioned vested interests (Bértola, 2015 cited in 
Fouquet, 2019: p.5). Furthermore, much of the explanation for the failure to use natural 
resources effectively is down to the institutions (Clay, 2010 cited in Fouquet, 2019: p.5).   
 Role of energy system transitions: Major energy technologies and transitions have 
been fundamental to major phases of economic growth in history (Freeman & Louça, 
2001 cited in Fouquet, 2019: p.11). The growth in markets for energy sources were 
closely linked to other technologies and industries. These energy systems created mutual 
markets for each other’s products, achieving economies of scale and declining costs.  
Fouquet (2019: p.12) concludes that “institutional support [for green growth] will not be needed in 
the long run” but “will only be required to place the economy on the new ‘green growth’ pathway.” 
Worker (2017) highlights the importance of political economy analysis in assessing ways to 
frame proposed policies to catalyse new coalitions or address vested interests. Naess et al. 
(2015) apply a political economy analysis to case studies on low carbon energy in Kenya and 
carbon forestry in Mozambique, examining the intersection of climate and development policy. In 
doing this they “demonstrate the critical importance of politics, power and interests when climate-
motivated initiatives encounter wider and more complex national policy contexts, which strongly 
influence the prospects of achieving integrated climate policy and development goals in practice.” 
From this analysis they argue (Naess et al., 2015):  
1. Understanding both the informal nature and historical embeddedness of decision 
making around key issue areas and resource sectors of relevance to climate change 
policy is vital to engaging actually existing politics; why actors hold the positions they do 
and how they make decisions in practice.  
2. Understanding and engaging with the interests, power relations and policy networks 
that will shape the prospects of realising climate policy goals is needed. 
3. By looking at the ways in which common global drivers have very different impacts upon 
climate change policy once refracted through national levels institutions and policy 
processes, it is easier to understand the potential and limits of translating global policy 
into local practice.  
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4. Climate change and development outcomes, and the associated trade-offs, look very 
different depending on how they are framed, who frames them and in which actor 
coalitions. Understanding these can inform the levers of change and power to be 
navigated, and with whom to engage in order to address climate change and 
development goals. 
Transitions theory and political science 
Roberts et al. (2018: p.304) explore the politics of accelerating low-carbon transitions, using 
three themes to organise ideas and examples:  
1) The role of coalitions in supporting and hindering acceleration: The key points from 
Roberts et al.’s (2017: p.306) discussion of this theme are that “coalitions of government, 
business and civic actors matter for accelerating transitions, and that in practice, they are 
often opportunistic alignments of actors motivated by concerns other than mitigating 
climate change. These coalitions, furthermore, must fight an uphill battle to defeat 
counter-coalitions.” From reviewing the literature, Roberts et al. (2017: p.305) highlight 
the following important points in relation to coalitions: they have a need to be supported 
both financially and politically, parties with divergent views need to be bought on board, 
climate change mitigation is often a “co-benefit” to the actors engaged and their main 
priorities will be outside of this (e.g. energy security, job creation etc.) (see also Schmitz, 
2017). There is still further work needed, especially into the composition of successful 
and unsuccessful alliances. 
2) The role of feedbacks, through which policies may shape actor preferences which, 
in turn, create stronger policies: Roberts et al.’s (2017: p.307) summarise this theme 
discussion by highlighting that “Transitions (and policies) are often started by coalitions, 
which may well evolve over time along with the policies they initially supported. 
Contextual factors, including economic structures, national technological infrastructures, 
and political institutions will also be an important determinant of policy feedback effects, 
because context shapes the immediate political consequences of policies. This link to 
context makes policy feedback a particularly apposite framework for comparative 
research, across contexts or across types of policy.” Feedback and stability are closely 
linked to the other two themes. Lederer et al.’s (2018: p.12) argument that a key 
characteristic of the green economy approach “is that ecological, social, and economic 
issues should be approached in an integrated manner and that they entail different types 
of feedback effects” – i.e. synergies from positive interactions and trade-offs from 
adverse effects, builds on this point. Both synergies and trade-offs are the result of 
interaction, may come about through either deliberate action or as unintended 
consequences, and can themselves be subject to bureaucratic management. The 
analysis of the politics of a green economy should thus be concerned with identifying 
possible synergies but even more with discerning trade-offs and the resulting winners 
and losers. 
3) The role of broader contexts (political economies, institutions, cultural norms, and 
technical systems) in creating more (or less) favourable conditions for deliberate 
acceleration: The nature and speed of low-carbon transitions varies enormously 
between different national, regional, and local contexts. The influence of context on 
transitions is likely to be shaped by factors discussed in the other two themes. Roberts et 
al.’s (2017: p.307) summarise this as “The effects of diverse political economics will 
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partly shape coalitions both supporting and opposing change, institutional context and 
associated ideas can influence the immediate impacts of policies, and the extent to which 
these impacts create feedbacks. Temporal context is also important. Depending on the 
configuration of political and economic forces at any one time, ‘windows of opportunity’ 
might open up around which discourse coalitions, policy entrepreneurs and new 
coalitions of interest can mobilise to accelerate change. Key contextual dimensions which 
may affect the scope for the deliberate acceleration of low-carbon transitions include 
technological capabilities; natural resource endowments, industrial specialisation, and 
cultural repertoires.” The authors also caution that trying to apply insights from one 
context to another is itself inherently difficult and risky. 
The role of the State in green economy discourses and sustainability transitions 
Andrews and Nwapi (2018) explain that different ideological swings in the global political 
economy resulted in what may be regarded as the rise and fall of the state’s centrality in 
economic development. In the current era, the state is seen as a viable option to correct the 
failures of globalisation.  
Death (2015) explores four discourses of the green economy (the discourses of green resilience, 
green growth, green transformation and green revolution), a term which means different things to 
different people and in different contexts. He highlights that there has been a relative dearth of in-
depth analysis of green economy strategies in the global South, meaning that understanding is 
restricted, especially in relation to national strategies and developmental programmes being 
deployed. Death (2015) in his review highlights how the four discourses (all interconnected) have 
manifested in different real-world examples of national green economy strategies in the global 
South3, and have different political implications demonstrating the political significance of the 
                                                   
3 Green resilience – brings ‘the climate crisis’ and ‘the environmental crisis’ into stark visibility, together with their 
impact on vulnerable societies, and a resilient green economy is to be achieved by a combination of technocratic 
interventions by states and development institutions, together with empowered communities who (it is hoped) can 
draw on their own sources of resilience. Ethiopia’s ‘Climate‐resilient Green Economic Strategy’ is a high-profile 
example, which is a largely top-down project driven by an autocratic president; it can be seen in a longer history 
of state-led, hierarchical and often coercive modernisation projects (Death, 2015: p.2212-2213).  
Green growth – has been the dominant global form of the green economy discourse since the financial crisis, 
with environmental changes and programmes primarily viewed as an economic opportunity, not a threat. Most 
national development strategies in the global South emphasise the importance of achieving higher levels of 
growth and development, and many present green technologies and investments as one way to ‘leapfrog’ older 
and more inefficient industrialisation paths. Prominent examples include Ethiopia, China and South Africa (Death, 
2015: pp.2213-2214). 
Green transformation – economic growth remains the driver of progress, the environment is a resource for 
human development and green developmental states are the regulators and guarantors of development. South 
Africa’s ‘Green Economy Accord’, Mozambique’s ‘Green Economy Action Plan’ and Rwanda’s ‘National Strategy 
for Climate Change and Low Carbon Development’ are all examples of national strategies with strong elements 
of this transformational discourse. South Korea is the most prominent and most frequently cited example of 
green transformation (Death, 2015: pp.2215-2216). 
Green revolution – environmental activists have been crucial in building pressure for more transformational 
green economy strategies, but many such activists are now publicly sceptical of mainstream discourses of green 
growth and green transformation, and are often attached to a discourse of “green revolution” – a realignment of 
economic (and hence social and political) relationships to bring them in line with natural limits and ecological 
virtues. Costa Rica has received international praise for its revolutionary approach to the green economy, 
including turning payments for ecosystem services from a principle into practice and its commitment to eco-
tourism. Yet champions of this discourse have also attracted criticism for failing to live-up to their revolutionary 
potential in practice, for example, Costa Rica has discovered that rising land values mean that it has become 
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type of green economy discourse adopted by governments. He concludes that “the major 
commonality in all these national strategies and articulations of the green economy is the central 
role of the state” (Death, 2015: p.2219). Although he cautions that “the emergence of green 
states in the global South[…] – defined  here as states which use the discourses of 
environmentalism and ‘green branding’ to legitimate their development politics – might have 
more in common with colonial, racist or authoritarian states than some of the more optimistic 
narratives of ecological modernisation assume” (Death, 2015: p.2219).  
Johnstone and Newell (2017) explore understandings of the multiple and conflicting roles that 
states play in sustainability transitions. A number of positions have been advocated in relation to 
the state and sustainable energy transitions. Johnstone and Newell (2017: p.79) conclude that 
there is a need to “widen the analytical lens in transitions thinking to incorporate and understand 
the multiple and diffuse forms of state power,” but that this “requires an appreciation that the 
state is not neutral with respect to the actors and processes it is charged with regulating” 
(Johnstone & Newell, 2017: p.79). They present five ways of conceptualising the role of the state 
in sustainability transitions, namely (Johnstone & Newell, 2017: pp.76-79):  
1. Historical understandings of the state: This goes beyond tracing the history and evolution 
of particular policy interventions, with the emphasis on how particular approaches to and 
ideologies of regulation are circumscribed by the broader political economy in which they 
are evolving, as well as seeking to re-shape. Bringing to the fore shifts in the form and 
functioning of the state overtime, including power dynamics . 
2. Global and spatial analysis of the state: Global and spatial analysis of the role of the state 
in transitions re-embeds the state within networks of power normally associated with the 
landscape; appreciating where global shifts have reconfigured state autonomy and 
recognising the power of global institutions to influence the form and direction of 
transition pathways across the globe. 
3. Multiple dimensions of state power: The multi-functionality of states and the multiple 
dimensions of state power (such as the role of the military establishment) should be 
accounted for in the role of the state in transitions. ‘Non-environmental’ policy regimes 
will often be more decisive in determining, and often undermining, the effectiveness of 
policies pursuant of transitions to sustainability.  
4. Relational understandings of the state: Need to avoid fetishising the state as a political 
and institutional configuration abstracted from broader social and economic relations that 
characterise the economic system in which states are situated and within which they 
have to compete. Addressing who the state serves and which interests it seeks to protect 
is vital to assessing the prospects of more radical and progressive interventions.  
5. Material accounts of the state: Important to recognise the material implications different 
technologies have, and how this impinges on the institutional practices of the state. The 
characteristics or materialities of ‘technology’ contribute to the (re)production of different 
forms governmental practice or governmentalities. 
                                                   
‘un-economic’ not to farm land, even when ecosystem services are fully priced (Death, 2015: pp.2217-2218). 
Brazil is another example of a national development trajectory that, while sometimes progressive, hardly lives up 
to the potential for a green revolution. Its green credentials have been further tested through the Presidency of 
Bolsonaro who has overturned many of Brazil’s green growth strategies and protections. This demonstrates the 
vulnerability of country’s attempts to pursue green pathways to political dynamics. 
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Kemp and Never (2017) suggest options for what governments in developing countries can 
usefully and realistically do to phase in green technologies by learning from more advanced 
countries, using successful phase-in cases of energy efficiency and solar-PV in industrialised 
economies (Germany, the Netherlands) and, more relevant to this review, emerging economies 
(China, India). They argue that phasing-in of green technologies in developing countries is 
more about utilising the opportunities already present that coincide with development 
objectives. The paper takes a transition management perspective to phasing-in green 
technologies. Transition management “seeks to overcome a situation of lock-in and market 
failure by co-producing and coordinating policies step by step with clear targets and programmes 
for system innovation” (Kemp & Never, 2017: p.69). Transition management assigns an active 
role to states in mobilising resources and interests in society towards change and requires a 
long time-span with several cycles of adjusting policies. Kemp and Never (2017: pp.81-82) 
highlight the following six elements as being useful, helping to enhance the chances of success 
of a green transition (although in no way guaranteeing it):   
1. Pro-active planning on the part of government (in the form of a long-term vision and a 
clear roadmap with interim goals and steps) constitutes a useful starting point for any 
transition approach, in providing direction and guidance to innovation actors and 
investment decisions.  
2. Careful selection of options for support and the forms of support and is best done 
with the help of independent experts. Subsidy schemes should be time-bound, and 
monopoly rents should be avoided. Auctions are a useful model here. Rent management 
(for new and old technologies) should be mindful of the politics that operate (the 
opposition from fossil fuel companies and opposition from within the government), who 
will use negative outcomes to delegitimise the entire transition project, in an attempt to 
dissolve it.  
3. A sequential approach helps to make use of contingencies and lessons, while 
maintaining a sense of direction. This can take the form of gradual tightening of 
regulations and standards or the testing in pilot projects before supporting a broader up-
scaling.  
4. Explicitly including policy learning in the phase-in process to achieve socio-
economically acceptable and successful implementation (this is connected to the third 
element). Policies need to be adjusted to new (market and technology) circumstances 
and remedy negative effects (in the form of windfall gains for some groups and the 
occurrence of new problems because of problem shifting). The Chinese and Indian cases 
have shown that allowing some policy space for strategic bundling of interests at local 
levels may be an important part of this policy learning.  
5. Designing a policy package has been helpful in the examples examined. This policy 
package can include both policy-push and market-pull policies as well as R&D,  
institutional capability, skill and job creation measures, e.g. building up a consultancy and 
certification industry. 
6. Adequate implementation control mechanisms need to be put in place. The building 
and financing of technology-testing facilities and the evaluation of implementation 
schemes are as important as fostering consumer awareness for an energy efficiency 
label, for example. 
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Institutions, coalitions and actors 
Worker (2017) in a GSDRC Topic Guide looks at climate change governance and the political 
economy of climate policy development and implementation at the national scale. Worker (2017: 
p. 13) gives examples of how countries are addressing the institutional challenge of dealing 
with climate change in different ways with creative climate commitment devices. For 
example, China has created the National Energy Commission, which has ‘super ministry’ status 
and can influence other ministries and reports directly to state council (Bailey, 2014 cited in 
Worker, 2017: p. 13). At the same time, China’s government has given significant autonomy to 
provincial governments to experiment with policies to achieve the targets and goals. The Topic 
Guide also highlights how “Most countries face huge political challenges to decarbonise their 
economies while addressing structural and societal drivers of vulnerability […] Effective 
responses will require building new coalitions and strengthening existing ones” (Walker, 
2017: p. 18). Institutional capacity determines the ability to either take on the active coordination 
of intersectoral mitigation actions or to engage nonstate actors in making up for the state’s limited 
capacity. Worker (2017: p. 21) finds that “renewable energy policy implementation can become 
more achievable when multi-stakeholder coalitions recognise their interests are aligned 
and they can act collectively to strengthen institutions and foster a better enabling 
environment for implementation.” Coalitions may need support to seize windows of opportunity 
when vested interests are politically vulnerable because of energy price volatility, new political 
narratives or external pressure. 
Pegels et al. (2018: p.28) argues that “although governments need to play a proactive role, 
they cannot bring about change at the required scale and speed single-handedly. They 
need to coordinate with nonstate actors.” Pegels et al. (2018: p.29) elaborate that governments 
need to play a more active role in in guiding markets but also to introduce additional and 
fundamentally new policy instruments. These actions need to be coordinated with nonstate 
actors. They further argue that “For green energy policy to be successful, three main conditions 
need to be ensured: efficiency, effectiveness, and legitimacy” (Pegels et al., 2018: p.30). These 
three conditions share four underlying factors (Pegels et al., 2018: p.31):  
 Broad societal agreement on the direction of change – this lends legitimacy to 
transformative policy and increases its effectiveness. Morocco is an illustrative example 
of this, where the government has legitimised its actions in greening the economy by 
developing a long-term vision for green growth, building coalitions across national state 
and nonstate actors, harnessing synergies from green investments in different sectors 
(i.e., energy, agriculture, manufacturing, and housing), gradually reforming fossil-fuel 
subsidies, and seeking ways to compensate vulnerable population groups (Vidican-
Auktor, 2017 cited in Pegels et al., 2017: p.32). 
 Change alliances – can strengthen the chances of broad societal agreement, since less 
powerful actors can join forces to support the transformation. For example, alliances can 
be seen as vehicles for bundling diverse interests, employment effects in particular have 
been crucial arguments for the green transformation in emerging economies such as 
China and Brazil. 
 Systematic policy learning – enhances effectiveness and also efficiency. India and 
South Africa provide interesting examples of systematic policy learning over time in 
relation to renewable energy introduction, in particular solar and wind energy.  
 The use of market mechanisms to manage policy rents and political capture – 
improves efficiency, increases effectiveness and legitimacy. 
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Lederer et al. (2018: p.12) warn against a simplistic linear understanding of change and 
cause and effect in capturing the influence of actors in transformations. They approach the 
analysis of the politics of a green economy “as being the product of competing constellations of 
opportunity structures (see Clemencon, 2016; Han, 2017), actors and discourses.” They highlight 
the role of change agents as strategic actors who are (sometimes unconscious) pioneers of 
social change. They focus on different analytical aspects that may drive proactive state 
behaviour toward a green economy: analysing whether, why, and how particular interests are 
given preferential treatment in the context of national policy formulation and implementation (e.g. 
Costa Rica) or are hardly included at all (e.g. China).  
Schmitz (2017) explores the question – who drives low-carbon policies? – focusing on the 
rising powers of Brazil, China, India and South Africa. Schmitz (2017: p.522) stresses that 
“transformation results from a concurrence of multiple changes.” Transformation requires path 
creation (rather than path dependency), which requires agency distributed across heterogeneous 
actors, and there is a wide theoretical literature on this. While different groupings have been put 
forward (mostly around civil society, government, incumbents, entrepreneurs – see Schmitz, 
2017 for further references and information on this), there is recognition that no single group 
can bring about the required changes. Reviewing political science scholarship, he finds a well-
founded body of evidence that coalitions, particularly multi-sectoral ones, can be effective in 
addressing collective action problems. Schmitz (2017) uses political economy analysis to explore 
four case studies (see Brazil, China, India and South Africa sections below for summaries). The 
syntheses pay more attention to government and business actors, but Schmitz (2017: 
p.534) emphasises that  this does not imply that civil society organisations are irrelevant 
but that “they have been less influential, or at least seemed to have been, in the case material” 
reviewed. Schmitz (2017: p.534) draws three general conclusions from the case studies: 
1. The motives for supporting climate-relevant policies vary a great deal. These 
motives can be seen to fall into two groups: material and moral. Most importantly, they 
are not mutually exclusive but – in some cases – complementary. In all four cases the 
most significant actors had other priorities other than climate change mitigation. 
2. There are different types of alliances. At one end, there is the strategic alliance based 
on joint action; at the other is the mere alignment of interest without coordination between 
the parties. Closely related and also very useful is the distinction between consciously 
pursued and incidental alliance. Both can be transitional (short term) or enduring (long 
term), but the incidental alliance is more likely to be short term. 
3. Alliances make a difference and are instrumental in accelerating change or 
blocking it. Although the case material on how alliances organise and operate is patchy. 
Furthermore, Schmitz cautions against getting carried away with alliance thinking.  
The cases say less on who obstructs climate-related policies, but important insights emerge 
(Schmitz, 2017: p.534):  
 Energy shortages provide a window of opportunity to create new paths and to try 
out and establish renewable energies. Opposition from the fossil fuel industry did not 
seem to play a role in the cases of China and India because energy shortages due to 
rapidly rising demand were the main concern. The advance of one was not at the 
expense of the other.  
 Context matters and there are many contextual variables. The key ones emerging 
from the reviewed cases are natural endowments (for example, fossil fuel reserves), the 
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degree of energy shortage, what stage the country is at in its transition to renewables, 
and the institutional system.  
What is the “developmental state”? 
The “developmental state” concept has been prominent in political economy discussions after it 
was used to explain the economic transformation experienced by East Asian countries such as 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore after World War II. Andrews and Nwapi 
(2018: p.49) in their analysis of the emerging developmental state in Africa’s energy sector, 
explore the literature on the developmental state and explain that “Simply put, a developmental 
state is one that ‘gives first priority to economic development’ ([Johnson, 1999], 37). […But,] the 
developmental state also implies state-led development or state intervention in economic policy.” 
Johnson’s (1999) seminal piece on the developmental state in Japan, which highlights key 
strategies that made Japan’s impressive economic success a “miracle”, emphasises the state as 
a major (though not sole) factor. The concept of the developmental state is also associated with 
industrial policy, which is often “characterised by state promotion of infant industries via 
instruments like export facilitation, subsidies to local industries, trade protection, and preferential 
treatment in favo[u]r of local businesses.” Based mainly on Johnson’s (1999) seminal work on 
the East Asian experience, scholars have identified a set of four defining features of a successful 
developmental state, including development-oriented political leadership, an autonomous 
and effective bureaucracy, performance-oriented governance, and production 
coordination and conflict management (Andrews & Nwapi, 2018: p.49).  
Nem Singh and Ovadia (2018: p.1035) highlight three key elements of the developmental state 
model, although they caution that there is a need to avoid one-size fits all approaches to 
development policy:  
(1) state transformation through the creation of a professionalised, meritocratic 
bureaucracy alongside a fairly insulated group of technocrats, which overall constitutes 
the historical development of state capacity widely referred to as ‘pockets of state 
efficiency’; (2) a pro-business orientation in policy-making that created a mutually-
beneficial alliance between states and big business, notably referred to as ‘embedded 
autonomy’; and (3) the presence of exceptionally difficult circumstances, which then 
creates a structural condition in which national elites must deal with their ‘systemic 
vulnerability’ and hence focus on economic development as the principal source of their 
political legitimacy. 
Dent (2018: p.1192) explains that there are “hard” developmental states (e.g. Japan, Singapore, 
South Korea and Taiwan) and “soft” developmental states (e.g. Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia 
and the Philippines) which practiced certain features of developmental statism less rigorously 
and effectively. Furthermore, developmental statism is part of a broader state capacity paradigm 
that includes conventionally classified ‘socialist market’ states like China and Vietnam, where 
state-owned enterprises dominate over key areas of the economy.  
There have been questions as to the extent to which the developmental state model(s) can be 
adapted beyond East Asia’s geographical, socio-political and historical conditions to provide 
alternative ways of doing development in the global South. But many scholars see that beyond 
its origins in East Asia’s export-led industrialisation, the developmental state framework 
continues to offer a useful approach to analysing the role of the state in economic and social 
development (see Nem Singh & Ovadia, 2018). Nem Singh and Ovadia (2018) highlight 
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Argentina, Brazil, Ethiopia, Rwanda and China as newer examples of developmentalist thinking 
with varying success. Their growth strategies involve centralising rent management, 
strengthening political ties between government and domestic capitalists and adapting industrial 
policy and state-backed finance to create new competitive advantages. 
There are varied experiences of state-directed development, and the relationship between the 
type of political regime and the developmental state is complex and multifaceted. Examining 
recent transformations of developmental states, Williams (2014: p.2) argues that “some kind of 
developmental state is essential to achieve development in the twenty-first century.” However, 
emphasises that the assumption that there is a blueprint of effective state structures and action 
must be rejected. Williams (2014) maintains that scholars need to rethink and expand the 
analytical reach of the developmental states. In her introduction to The end of the developmental 
state? she puts forward four pivotal conditions that have compelled changes in the goals and 
strategies of recent developmental states (such as Brazil, China, India, South Africa and South 
Korea): economic restructuring, domestic politics, epistemic shifts and ecological limits. The 
volume hence eschews model thinking but encourages lessons to be learned from the country 
experiences, encouraging “country-specific development that takes seriously local conditions, 
social demands from a myriad of class forces and domestic politics” (Williams, 2014: p.24). 
The developmental state and low-carbon development 
Dent (2018) looks at how countries in East Asia have moved beyond original conceptions of 
developmental statism with new and evolving forms of state capacity to respond to the global 
challenge of climate change, using South Korea and Singapore as case studies. Dent (2018: 
p.1191) argues that this “new developmentalism4 is most clearly evident in East Asia but can be 
applied in a wider geographic sense where strong forms of developmental state capacity are 
exercised towards meeting transformative sustainable development goals.” The nature and 
practice of state capacity in East Asia have evolved significantly over time. Dent (2018) argues 
that the challenge of addressing sustainable development has presented more of an opportunity 
than a threat to state capacity in East Asia. Despite the rise in civil society and its role in 
development, “a top-down authoritarian state approach to pushing through low-carbon 
development strategies has often been a political and institutional feature of East Asia’s new 
developmentalism” (Dent, 2018: p.1196), and this is demonstrated in his discussion of South 
Korea and Singapore.  
From the South Korea and Singapore case studies and his analysis, Dent (2018: pp.1204-1205) 
describes the following conditions as being needed for new developmentalism’s future success:  
1. Deeper societal participation and engagement: The importance of the state co-opting 
society into transformative development projects has been emphasised. Civil society is a 
crucial stakeholder in terms of contributing ideas on strategy design and providing useful 
societal intelligence feedback on strategy impact. For example, in Singapore – where 
state capacity is extraordinarily strong – the government sought public opinion 
concerning the Sustainable Singapore Blueprint’s design, implementation and outcome 
stages, but was nevertheless criticised for being essentially elite–technocrat-driven and 
                                                   
4 An analytical synthesis of state capacity and ecological modernisation theories (see Dent, 2018). 
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top-down generally. South Korea’s recent political leaders have also generally adopted a 
top-down approach in pushing through their own sustainable development agendas.  
2. Addressing contradictions and inconsistencies often evident within new 
developmentalist plans themselves, and between those plans and other concurrent 
development policies. For example, in South Korea, the First Green Growth Strategy co-
existed with the then Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy’s parallel industrial strategy 
of upgrading various stalwart energy-intensive sectors such as shipbuilding and steel. 
Singapore’s aforementioned burgeoning petrochemical complex on Jurong Island 
remains central to the government’s core industrial policy.  
3. Consolidation and continuity of strategy: This is crucial for effective implementation. 
Mono-regime authoritarian states may be expected to adhere to long-term new 
developmentalist strategies and thereby consolidate their gains. For example, China has 
proved more successful at meeting its green energy sector targets, than Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan. Although this authoritarian new developmentalism may persist for a 
while yet, we can expect over the longer term more organic, bottom-up societal influence 
on shaping future paths of low-carbon development. 
Vazquez-Brust et al. (2014) explore the idea of a “Green Growth State” in their paper, looking to 
connect the gap between Green Growth and Developmental State studies, with a focus on the 
case of South Korea. They argue for the importance of the Green Growth State and highlight 
key elements of this overarching concept for transformation as broadly being: a flexible, 
sequential and diverse policy mix; value-driven, multi-stakeholder, multi-level 
governance; public trust and collaboration; and appropriate measurements of progress 
discouraging commodification of nature. Vazquez-Brust et al. (2014) argue that as 
coordination needs characterise early stages of any socio-technical transition, markets will be 
inefficient in the initial stage of transitions from ‘‘brown’’ growth to ‘‘green’’ growth, and that state 
intervention will be necessary. They highlight that this was the case in the East Asian miracle 
(i.e. the economic growth of East Asian countries after World War II). They use the example of 
South Korea, where “the development of the Green Growth agenda has been underpinned by a 
continuation of a strong government direction, but an overt concern for social cohesion and 
distributive justice” (p. 46). According to their analysis, Vazquez-Brust et al. (2014: p. 46) suggest 
that “successful developmental capitalism states require “corporate coherence” – among state 
officials in their commitment to the goals of the state – and connectedness to groups in civil 
society – including both developmental elites and community/neighbourhood representatives.” 
Furthermore, they argue that “the key to wider transition is most likely to be appropriate 
interdependent networks of individuals in key positions, such as in the South Korean Green 
Growth State where the Presidential Committee on Green Growth (PCGG) was drawn from 
governmental ministries and the private sector (Mathews, 2012; Rhee et al., 2012b)” (Vazquez-
Brust et al., 2014: p.46). However, pubic private collaboration needs to be balanced with wider 
societal embedding to avoid capture of the state by business interests. This need is illustrated by 
more recent gridlock in the traction of the Green Growth agenda in South Korea, where, after 
initial support, private companies later moved to oppose the speed of economic greening 
(Vazquez-Brust et al., 2014: pp.46-47). 
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3. Case studies 
Brazil 
Schmitz (2017: pp.530-532) explores the case study of Brazil, which has met increasing energy 
demand with renewable sources, mainly biofuel (sugar cane) and hydropower. The high share of 
renewables in the energy mix has helped Brazil to take a climate-friendly position in international 
fora and is the result of government policies adopted over the course of four decades. The 
policies were driven by foreign exchange, energy security, industrial policy and job creation 
motives, similar to the motives that prevailed in China and India (see case studies below).  
However, translating global ambitions into national realities has been difficult because more 
recent climate policies have cut across additional sectors, creating power struggles and conflicts 
between ministries and rent-seeking industries, slowing progress (Schmitz, 2017: pp.530-532). 
Under the presidency of Dilma Rousseff, the climate agenda lost momentum because of these 
conflicting interests, and with the accession of Bolsonaro have slipped further.  
Furthermore, wind and solar are relatively underdeveloped in Brazil despite considerable 
resources. Interestingly, concerns from opposition within the renewables sector itself (from 
hydroelectricity and sugarcane industries) have seemed to have played a role in undermining 
energy and solar. This demonstrates that the political dynamics are more complex than low 
carbon versus high carbon sources. This competition among renewables producers is often 
overlooked within political economy analysis of climate-relevant policies. It is important to 
pay attention to the context in which conflicts between low-carbon forces take place 
(Schmitz, 2017: pp.530-532). In Brazil, this context is one of shrinking political space for 
low-carbon solutions and increasing political space for high-carbon solutions due to the 
discovery of significant oil reserves off the Brazilian coast.  
China 
Schmitz (2017: pp. 525-526) explains that although China has been the world’s biggest carbon 
emitter since 2006, it is incentivising investment in renewable energy to try to contain its 
emissions. Making renewables a priority has a strong legal foundation in the Renewable Energy 
Law of 2006, an umbrella regulation for renewable energy development. Climate 
considerations, however, were not the driving force behind the Renewable Energy Law, 
key concerns were securing energy and building a competitive industry. This aim to build 
up competitive green industries added to the political support for renewable energy policies. 
While policy formulation takes place at the central level, with the state seen as the central actor 
formulating policies in a top-down fashion, implementation has required active participation at the 
local level. Shen (2016 cited in Schmitz, 2017: p.230) has argued that, in recent years, business 
has come to play an active role in all stages of climate-relevant policy processes, particularly 
renewable energy, with an informal coalition of state–business actors playing a key role. The key 
actors are from the Energy Bureau of the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC), state-owned power utility companies, and large wind and solar parts manufacturers. 
Essential to the success of the coalition were opportunistic narratives that appealed to other 
parts of the state apparatus, which had different concerns such as energy independence, 
national security, technological catch-up, industrial expansion etc. The coalition encountered little 
opposition from the fossil fuel industries because of China’s rapidly growing energy demand the 
expansion of one was not at the expense of the other. Schmitz (2017) summarises that the 
question of who drives climate-relevant policies in China does not have a simple answer; 
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it varies over time and along the central–local axis. The bundling of interests, however, 
has been important in all instances, supporting the coalition perspective. 
India 
In recent years, India’s climate-relevant policies have been driven by concerns over climate 
change adaptation, secure energy access and job creation (Schmitz, 2016), with emission 
reductions considered a co-benefit. Schmitz (2017: pp.528-530) highlights the work of 
Chaudhary et al. (2014) who explore the solar and wind energy sectors to show that there are no 
easy answers to the question of who drives renewable energy policies in India. Many policies 
were adopted over different phases, with big differences between sectors, states and changing 
actor constellations. The solar sector benefits from the more comprehensive policies and political 
support. The largest policy initiative is the National Solar Mission, which is an explicit part of 
India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change. One of the key drivers of the National Solar 
Mission was Indian policy-makers’ aspiration to become a major global solar player by 
establishing a domestic solar manufacturing base. While energy security also played a role, it 
was the sector’s industrialisation potential (with  associated economic growth and job 
creation possibilities) that was the more important consideration for central policy-
makers.  
Political support for the wind energy sector is mainly due to energy security, and links back to the 
global energy crisis of the 1970s. The National Ministry of New and Renewable Energy became 
the most important institutional actor in shaping policy and securing resources. State 
governments also played a key role. Concerns with fostering industrial development did not drive 
the wind policies, at least not on the government side (Schmitz, 2017: p.529).  
Of interest to note, was the lack of opposition to solar and wind from fossil fuel industries, 
this is related to the fact that energy shortages were, and continue to be, a major problem 
in India. Schmitz (2017: p.530) summarises that the articulation of a co-benefits approach 
has enabled stakeholders to engage in the climate change debate in India without conceding 
on their priority of accelerating economic development. The pursuit of energy security has been 
the most powerful driver of domestic action. Other than the co-benefits approach, however, no 
coherent strategy exists, as is exemplified by the contrasts in political support for wind and solar 
power. 
South Africa 
Schmitz (2017: pp.532-533) explain how cheap and plentiful coal-generated energy has been 
essential for South Africa’s “minerals and energy complex”. Actors from business, the 
government and trade unions have used their engagement in the policy-making process to keep 
energy prices low and minimise the amount spent on supporting renewable energy, with a key 
player in this alliance being the state-owned energy supplier Eskom. However, a crisis in 
electricity supply has loosened the grip of the minerals and energy complex on the policy process 
and driven the development of renewable energy policies. On the government side, the coalition 
in favour of renewables consists of the Policy and Clean Energy Branch of the Department of 
Energy, the National Treasury, the Department of Environmental Affairs, and parts of the 
Department of Trade and Industry; and private sector support comes from foreign-based 
independent power producers and ancillary business professionals tied to their operations 
(Schmitz, 2017). This multi-sectoral constituency is aligned under the Renewable Energy 
Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (RE-IPPPP), which is inter-ministerial. 
16 
This alliance is gaining influence over the policy process and creating a platform for a renewable 
energy path, but the process has been messy. The main opposition to renewables comes from 
Eskom and its allies in the Departments of Public Enterprises and of Minerals and Energy 
(Worker, 2017). Moves towards renewables continue to be contested and there remains a 
struggle between these two coalitions, one against and one in favour of renewables, 
splitting the public and the private sectors while civil society (trade unions and 
householder associations) remains undecided. Political momentum for the renewable energy 
programme has also been important in its success. The renewables agenda is thus linked to an 
agenda of breaking up a vertically integrated, state-owned, company backed by the Department 
of Public Enterprises and Department of Minerals and Energy (Schmitz, 2017: p.533). 
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